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ABSTRACT 
 
Thinking about Crime: 
Race and Lay Accounts of Law-Breaking Behavior 
 
Lay or common sense accounts of the origins of criminal behavior may play both a 
key role in sustaining the apparently strong public appetite for harsh criminal 
justice policies as well as undergird large black-white differences in opinion in this 
domain. Using data from the nationally representative 2001 "Race, Crime, and 
Public Opinion Study" we develop an explanatory mode typology of accounts for 
involvement in criminal behavior. These accounts range from strongly 
individualistic to strongly social structural, with some respondents falling into a 
mixed mode category.  We identify key differences in the demographic 
and sociopolitical bases of the attributional types and find significant race 
differences in attributional types.  Attributions strongly affect how individuals wish 
to see public policy respond to the problem of crime and explain a small but 
significant fraction of the black-white difference in crime policy views.   Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Matters of law enforcement and criminal justice remain sites of deep racial 
tension in the U.S. Newsworthy flare-ups over police shootings, accusations of racial 
profiling, and a “War on Drugs” regarded by many as both excessive and 
unsuccessful highlight a pointedly race-inflected divide regarding the problem of 
crime in the U.S. and appropriate policy responses to it (Wacquant 2001; Kennedy 
2003; Roberts 2003; Western 2006; Tonry and Melewski 2008).   In this research 
we focus on one possible source of this racial polarization: namely, whether there 
are significant differences in how white and black Americans understand the very 
problem of crime itself. 
  High profile events and some key crime response policies (i.e., the crack 
versus powder cocaine sentencing differential) may elicit sharply polarized 
reactions from blacks and whites primarily because the groups have very different 
basic understandings of the sources of criminal behavior.  For example, those who 
generally understand criminal behavior as rooted in personal dispositions and 
irresponsible individual choices may be inclined to endorse aggressive and punitive 
responses to crime in policing and in social policy.  Alternatively, those who 
generally understand criminal behavior as having systematic social roots in 
conditions of poverty, unemployment, or other societal impediments may recoil 
against such punishment-centered styles of response to crime.  If distinctive ways of 
thinking about the sources of criminal behavior vary systematically by race, then Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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blacks and whites may, in sum,  be worlds apart in the basic social meanings they 
attach to criminal behavior.     
  We seek to shed light on this possibility using data from the “Race, Crime, 
and Public Opinion” project (RCPO), which allows us to assess the extent, sources, 
and effects of black-white differences in attributions for criminal behavior (Bobo 
and Johnson 2001)1.  The RCPO survey involves large national samples of white and 
black Americans and includes measures of beliefs about the causes of criminal 
behavior.  The RCPO also contains measures of other factors relevant to judgments 
about crime such as an individual’s prior victimization, fear of crime, general 
sociopolitical identities and ideology, as well as policy views on crime.  In addition, 
we are able to append to these data key contextual information about actual levels 
of serious crime in the respondent’s community. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Attribution Process:  Social psychologists have long maintained that the 
meaning social phenomenon have for us turns crucially on how we explain or 
account for observable social phenomenon (Heider 1958). That is, meaning is 
importantly bound up with the everyday process of attribution making, or more 
specifically, it involves how we construct causal accounts for the phenomenon we 
observe.  Heider’s (1958) groundbreaking work on internal or dispositional 
attributions and external or situational attributions is a useful specification of how 
                                                        
1 Description and reports on the surveys (Bobo and Johnson 2004) and focus groups 
(Bobo 2004; Bobo and Thompson 2006) have appeared elsewhere (see also Johnson 
2008; Bobo and Thompson 2009). Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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causal attributions influence the assessment of individual responsibility.   For 
example, following Heider’s reasoning, individuals who believe the unemployed are 
jobless because they have a poor work ethic, an internal attribution, are more likely 
to see the jobless as personally responsible for their lack of employment.  However, 
individuals who believe that unemployment is rooted in poor economic conditions, 
an external attribution, are much less likely to hold individuals responsible for their 
unemployment, instead focusing on broad structural conditions.  In other words, the 
causal locus of the attribution has fundamental consequences for how people 
evaluate and perceive the actions of others. 
Weiner’s (1974) typology expanded on Heider’s (1958) categories to include 
both a locus of causality (internal/external) dimension in addition to a stability 
dimension (stable/unstable).  Accordingly,  people may make attributions for 
behavior that involve an internal and stable attribute (i.e., “She did well on the test 
because she is highly intelligent”).  Or they may make an attribution to an internal 
but unstable characteristic (i.e., “She did well on the test because she studied 
particularly hard this time”).  Likewise, attributions may be made to stable but 
external factors (“She did well on the test because it’s an easy exam”) or to unstable 
external factors (i.e., “It was just luck that she did well on the exam” [Weiner 1974]).  
The combination of these two dimensions into one typology was widely accepted as 
a model for understanding lay attributions.  And while there have since been many 
variations of this typology, the strength of the Weiner (1974) insight continues to 
serve as a useful framework through which to understand causal attributions for 
behavior. Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Much experimental social psychological research on attribution processes, 
however, focuses on judgments about the sources of individual task performance or 
direct interpersonal interaction.  Sociologists and political scientists have extended 
these insights to attributions about larger matters of observable supra-individual 
processes and social conditions.  Thus, for example, previous research sought to 
measure distinct patterns of popular belief about the causes of social inequality 
more generally  (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Wilson 1996) and with regard to racial 
inequality in particular (Schuman 1971; Apostle et al 1983; Sniderman and Hagen 
1985; Kluegel 1990; Hunt 2004; 2007).  
Sociological attribution:  Previous sociological research provides grounds to 
expect a strong tendency toward individualistic thinking when it comes to 
attributions about crime.  Work on beliefs about general economic inequality has 
pointed to a dominant individualistic ethos or ideology in U.S. public opinion (Mann 
1970; Huber and Form 1971; Kluegel and Smith 1986).   Kluegel and Smith (1986) 
summarize this tendency via what they term a “logic of opportunity syllogism.”  The 
major premise holds that there are many opportunities for economic advancement 
in American society.  Next, the logic goes, hard work and talent are rewarded in 
American society.  Therefore, any resulting economic inequality is largely seen as 
the fair and legitimate result of differences in individual effort and ability.  It seems 
reasonable to expect, therefore, that a similar strong general individualistic tilt may 
also exist when the focus shifts from economic inequality in general to the sources 
of involvement in crime in particular. Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Not everyone, to be sure, endorses an entirely individualistic account of 
social inequality.  In particular, lower income individuals as compared to high 
income individuals, blacks as compared to whites (especially), and those with strong 
liberal political identities as compared to conservatives, are all more likely to 
recognize external, supra-individual or structural constraints on economic 
opportunity (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Bobo 1991).   
The research on how Americans perceive and explain racial inequality has 
stressed the existence of distinct modes of explanation for race inequality (Apostle 
et al. 1983; Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Kluegel 1990; Sigelman and Welch 1991; 
and Hunt 2007).  These modes reflect the fact that few people express, single uni-
causal accounts of racial inequality and that many individuals recognize the 
operation of both individual level factors as well as external or structural factors.   
As might be expected, however, these “modes of explanation” vary considerably by 
race (Hunt 2007; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Sniderman and Hagen 1985).   African 
Americans are far more likely to attribute racial inequality to structural factors such 
as discrimination or inadequate educational opportunities as compared to whites 
who exhibit a clearer tendency to accept various dispositional or individualistic 
accounts (Kluegel 1990).    
Furthermore, racial differences in basic “modes of explanation” help to 
explain black-white differences in support for race-targeted policies (Kluegel 1990).  
For example, whites who adopt individualist explanations for inequality are much 
less likely to support policies that seek government spending or aid to address racial Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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inequality in the United States than whites who have a more structurally oriented 
explanation for inequality (Kluegel 1990).   The sizeable gap in black and white 
explanations for inequality remained largely unabated throughout the 1970’s and 
1980’s (Kluegel and Smith 1986) and as some recent work suggests became slightly 
less polarized in the 1990’s and 2000’s (Hunt 2007). 
Still, there is a dearth of research on “modes of explanation” in the context of 
the public response to crime and the matter of crime-related policy.   Much of the 
available research tends to focus on perceptions of the criminal justice system’s 
response to particular types of behavior (Carroll and Payne 1976; Carroll 1978) 
rather than on how people understand the origins of criminal behavior itself.  There 
has been to our knowledge little, if any, research on how individualist and 
structuralist accounts of behavior help to explain black and white differences in the 
evaluation of the criminal justice system and crime policy.  In addition, the existing 
information on racial differences in causal accounts of criminogenic behavior 
remains largely descriptive in nature and is incomplete for recent years (see Erskine 
1974)2. Given the polarization of attitudes between blacks and whites toward the 
criminal justice system in general (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Hagan, Shedd, and 
Payne 2005) and toward such issues as the War on Drugs in particular (Bobo and 
Thompson 2006), it is possible that racial differences in causal accounts of criminal 
behavior could help to explain differential support for punitive crime policies.   
                                                        
2 Erskine (1974) provides a good summary of polling results on the public understanding 
of criminogenic behavior.  However, there is a large gap in scholarship on polling trends 
post-1970 and the more recent scholarship tends to focus on the response to crime rather 
than the causes of crime (Shaw et al. 1998). Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Race and attributions:  There are four important reasons to expect 
differences in causal explanations for crime among blacks and whites.  First, despite 
enormous change and progress over the past several decades, African Americans 
remain socio-economically disadvantaged relative to whites and sharply segregated 
from whites in terms of residential location (Massey 2006).   Such profound 
structural differences in social location are quite likely to influence thinking about a 
socially defined and constructed problem such as crime.  Second, and more 
specifically, blacks and whites have historically encountered (Higginbotham 1996; 
Kennedy 1997) and certainly perceive in the present (Weitzer and Tuch 2006) very 
different experiences when it comes to their interactions with police and other 
institutions of the criminal justice system (Tonry 1995; Cole 1999; Mauer 1999; 
Western 2006).  Given these sharply different statuses, histories and contemporary 
experiences we believe whites and blacks are likely to have polarized views of the 
causes of crime.   
Thirdly, the perception by some that there is a racially biased system of 
social control (Quinney 1970; Chambliss and Seidman 1971; Hurwitz and Peffley 
2005) that reproduces inequality, leading many to question the very legitimacy of 
the system (Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Bobo and Thompson 2006), may also 
act to polarize public opinion about the origins of crime that lead to these disparities 
in the first place. Lastly, real differences in exposure to crime among blacks and 
whites (Bobo and Thompson 2010) suggest a pervasive experiential gap in exposure 
to crime and criminals that may lead to very different beliefs about criminogenic 
behavior (Pettit and Western 2004). For example, Bobo and Thompson (2010) Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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found that blacks were much more likely to have a friend or relative incarcerated 
than white respondents.  This was true, regardless of income level or education.  
Indeed, even among the middle-class, those with a college education earning more 
than $60K a year, nearly 1 in 3 blacks had a friend or relative incarcerated 
compared to only 1 in 20 whites.  Exposure to the American criminal justice system 
is far more common in the black community than in the white community. 
Ideology and attributions:  Beyond race itself, value based and ideological 
differences between individuals might also be a determining factor for how people 
understand the causes of crime in addition to the types of crime policy they support 
(Tyler and Weber 1982; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Bobo and Johnson 2004; 
Gottschalk 2008).   In particular, we know that political conservatism is highly 
correlated with support for such things as the death penalty, three-strike laws , and 
truth in sentencing laws (Soss, Langbein and Metelko 2003; Barkan and Cohen 
2005; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Matsueda and Drakulich 2009).  Therefore, it 
seems likely that a logic of personal responsibility is one of the factors that links 
value and ideological conservatism, on the one hand, to support for punitive policies 
on the other.  The attribution process may be a key piece of this logic.  Accordingly, 
those individuals of very traditional and conservative outlooks should be more 
likely than those of more liberal outlooks to make individualistic attributions about 
criminal behavior. 
Crime salience and attributions:  Actual exposure to serious crime may also 
shape attributions.  For multiple reasons, individuals who live in high crime areas, Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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who have been victimized, and who are highly fearful of crime may be motivated to 
see crime as more often a matter of individual responsibility than of social or 
structural causation.  A more individualistic view of criminal behavior would be 
consistent with an agentic, and therefore, potentially more rationally controllable 
and manageable view of the crime problem.  Such a view would also be a way of 
imposing a greater sense of right and wrong, or of moral order, on one’s social 
surroundings and life circumstances.  A personal or individual account of criminal 
behavior would also be a cognitively simple inference from the more general 
American cultural tendency toward individualism.  That is, it is reasonable to expect 
those for whom crime is a highly salient personal matter to lean in the direction of 
more individualistic accounts as doing so should be more psychologically 
parsimonious and comforting at several levels.   
In the end, we suspect all of these factors may determine support for crime 
policy and causal accounts of criminogenic behavior.  We seek however to 
understand how causal accounts of criminogenic behavior help to explain the 
polarized views that blacks and whites have of the criminal justice system, 
especially their support for crime policies, independent of these other factors.  That 
is, does mode of explanation explain the racial gap in support for crime policy even 
after these other factors are controlled?  Are the opinions of blacks and whites 
largely the product of fundamental differences in opinion about the sources of 
crime?  If so, how much of their support for particular crime policies can we explain 
by these differences?   Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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III.  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. Lay Accounts of Involvement in Crime:   
  In order to ascertain popular or lay accounts of criminal behavior, the Race, 
Crime and Public Opinion survey posed a series of four questions to respondents, in 
an agree/disagree format, specifying different potential root causes of criminal 
behavior.   The four statements and respective response distributions are shown in 
Table 1.   Of the four questions, the most widely endorsed lay account of crime 
involvement is that “people become criminals because they don't care about the 
rights of others or their responsibility to society”--a full 88.2% of whites and 73.8% 
of blacks endorse this explanation. The next most commonly accepted statement 
involves the structurally oriented belief that “poverty and low income in our society 
are responsible for much of crime”, with 61.7% of whites and 67.4% of blacks 
endorsing this position.   Finally, a smaller number of respondents believed that 
people turn to crime because they are lazy (Whites = 51.4%; Blacks = 37.0%) or that 
people turn to crime because our society does not guarantee that everyone has 
regular employment (Whites = 24.8%; Blacks = 49.5%). 
[Table 1 about here] 
The distributions in Table 1 immediately suggest that most respondents 
affirm both some degree of  personal or individualistic responsibility for criminal 
behavior as well as some situational or social structural accounts.  Very similar Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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tendencies toward an apparent multi-causal view of race-based inequality led 
Apostle and colleagues (1983), Sniderman and Hagen (1985), Kluegel (1990), and 
Hunt (2007) to identify distinctive modes of explanation of race inequality reflecting 
the intersection of the degree of acceptance of particular structural and individual 
accounts.  We follow this analytical approach.  Specifically, we employed a set of 
criteria for determining different “modes of explanation” for involvement with 
crime similar to that used by Kluegel (1990) and Hunt (2007). These scholars 
constructed modes of explanation for how respondents explained the Black-White 
socioeconomic gap using questions that tapped four possible outcomes, two of 
which were “person-centered/individualist” in nature (in-born ability and 
motivation),3 and two of which were structural in nature (discrimination and 
education). Our own set of questions measure similar dispositions toward crime 
involvement, and like Kluegel (1990) and Hunt (2007) we model our modes of 
explanation on the joint configuration of responses people used to explain 
involvement in crime. 
Respondents often endorse more than one explanation for why some people 
commit crime. For example, 91.7% of those who agree that “laziness” explains why 
people commit crimes also agree that people turn to crime because they “don't care 
about the rights of others” (whites = 95.9%; blacks = 86.0%).  And although there is 
                                                        
3 Hunt's (2007) terminology differs from Kluegel (1990) in that Hunt uses “person-
centered” to describe these traits because the “lack of ability” response to the GSS 
question denotes a deterministic behavior rather than one that reflects individual choice. 
Unlike Kluegel (1990) and Hunt (2007), our “individualist” responses (“lazy” and “don't 
care”) are presumably choices an individual makes and not the result of biological 
determinism. Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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not as much overlap in the structuralist items, 82.3% of respondents who agree that 
the primary reason people turn to crime is because “society does not guarantee that 
everyone has regular employment” also agree that “poverty and low income” are 
causes for crime involvement (whites = 85.3%; blacks 80.8%).  
The opposite is not true.  That is, while most of those who agreed “laziness” 
was the reason people turned to crime also agreed that criminals “don’t care about 
the rights of others,” only 49.6% of people who thought criminals “don't care about 
the rights of others” also thought people turned to crime because they are lazy.  
Similarly, only 48.0% of persons who endorsed the “poverty” attribute also 
endorsed the “no employment guarantee” attribute for why people commit crime,4 
compared to 82.3% for the opposite relationship.  Although focused on criminal 
behavior, these findings mirror previous research by Kluegel (1990) and Hunt 
(2007). 
Not unexpectedly, there is some overlap between individualist and 
structuralist “modes of explanation.” In general, people are rarely either entirely 
individualists or entirely structuralist in their causal explanations for crime 
involvement.  Indeed, 35% of the population agreed that “laziness” contributed to 
involvement in crime while also agreeing that “no employment guarantees” 
contributed to criminality, though much of this overlap occurred within the black 
population—50.0% of blacks agreed with both of these attributes compared to only 
                                                        
4 The exact reason for this is beyond the scope of this paper. We should note however, 
that Kluegel (1990) and Hunt (2007) find a similar relationship in the General Social 
Survey data. Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
  15 
23.7% of whites. A similar pattern exists when comparing those who believe people 
turn to crime because they “don't care about the rights of others.” Likewise, those 
who endorsed structuralist explanations for crime also agreed at times with 
individualist explanations. For example, 43.4% of those who believed “poverty” led 
people to criminal involvement also believed it was a product of people being “lazy” 
(whites = 49.5%; blacks = 38.0%). Given this overlap, we found it necessary to 
construct a mixed category for those who endorsed both structuralist and 
individualist views equally. 
B. Modes of Explaining Crime: 
Table 2 shows the joint configuration of responses we used to determine 
different “modes of explanation.” We sorted respondents who were exclusively 
individualist or structuralist in their responses in to either an individualist or 
structuralist “mode of explanation.” Individualists are people who endorsed either 
one or both individualist attributes and neither structuralist attribute, or they 
accepted both individualist attributes but also endorsed one of the structuralist 
attributes.5 The same pattern applies to structuralists. That is, structuralists 
                                                        
5 We initially considered a more complex 9-category explanatory mode typology.  After 
extensive analysis we concluded this complexity was not warranted.  That is, there were 
no significant advantages gained by introducing finer distinctions between categories. 
Specifically, we treated respondents who chose only individualist attributes or only 
structural attributes as “strong individualists” and “strong structuralists” and those who 
chose both individualist attributes and one structuralist attribute or both structuralist 
attributes and one individualist attribute as “weak individualists” and “weak 
structuralists,” respectively. However, in our analysis of possible antecedents of 
explanatory mode membership and of the effects of modes on policy views there were 
few differences between several of these more finely grained groupings. The differences 
that do exist between groups are among white respondents. Southern whites were more Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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endorsed either one or both of the structuralist attributes and neither individualist 
attribute, or they accepted both structuralist attributes but also endorsed one of the 
individual attributes.  
[Table 2 about here] 
In addition to these two polar modes of explanation, we created a “mixed” 
mode of attribution category for those who straddled the individualist/structuralist 
divide. We treated respondents as “mixed” if they affirmed one of each 
structuralist/individualist attribute but denied the other. For example, a “mixed” 
respondent might endorse the belief that people become criminals because they 
“don't care about the rights of others” (an individualist attribute), but they also 
endorsed the idea that “society does not guarantee that everyone has regular 
employment” (a structuralist attribute).  About 1 in 3 of all blacks and whites fell in 
to this category (see Figure 1). 
Finally, for whatever reason, a small portion of our sample did not endorse 
any attribute (N=79).  Whether or not this was because they literally had no views of 
why people turn to crime, or whether they simply did not like the specific options 
we offered is difficult to assess.  There are enough such individuals, however, to 
warrant treating them as a separate category.  Blacks were significantly more likely 
to belong to this group than whites. Fifty-one were African American (5.3% of 
African Americans) and 28 were white (2.9% of whites). Within the white 
                                                                                                                                                                     
likely to be “weak individualists” and ideologically conservative whites were more likely 
to be “strong individualists,” all else equal. Older whites were also less likely to be 
“strong structuralists.” Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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population, political “independents” and “liberals” were more likely to fall into this 
group.  Among blacks, “liberals” and respondents with high incomes were more 
likely to fall into this category. For both blacks and whites, those who feared crime 
the least were the most likely to fall in this category. 
Figure 1 presents the modes of explanation for criminal behavior by race. 
Several interesting patterns emerge. First, the majority of respondents believe that 
people are criminals because of some individual disposition toward criminality. To 
wit, if we combined the individualist and mixed mode respondents, nearly 8 in 10 
whites (81.9%), and 6 in 10 blacks (62.1%) endorsed at least one individualist 
attribute. Secondly, when we compare the “modes of explanation” by race, clear 
racial distinctions emerge. This is most apparent when we compare individualists 
and structuralists to each other. For instance, more than half of all whites (51.7%), 
are individualists compared to less than 1 in 3 blacks (28.8%). Comparatively, 
32.6% of blacks are structuralists while only 15.2% of whites are structuralists. In 
short, whites are more individualist in their explanations while blacks are more 
evenly distributed across groups.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Indeed, as Table 3 indicates, nearly 2 out of 3 individualists are white in our 
sample (63.9% of individualists are white), while the opposite is true for 
structuralists (64.5% of structuralists are black). If individualists are in fact more 
punitive in their approach to crime policy, and if more of them are white, it may be 
that a large percentage of the racial gap in support for policy is explainable by the Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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fact that individualists tend to be white. That is, modes of explanation may be 
powerful explanatory variables for why blacks and whites have very different levels 
of support for crime policies that go beyond values and ideology, salience of crime, 
and demographic characteristics such as age and years of education.  
[Table 3 about here] 
B.  Factors Affecting Attributions for Crime 
  Table 4 shows means for each of the modes of explanation in addition to the 
variables we think are important for whether or not people adopt a particular mode 
of explanation.  We include basic demographic characteristics (Race, Gender, 
Region, Age, Education, and Income), along with value-based and ideological factors 
(Democrat, Independent, Republican, Conservatism, and Church Attendance),6 and 
exposure to crime variables (Victim of Crime, Index Crime, Murder Rate, and Fear of 
Crime). 7  
[Table 4 about here] 
                                                        
6 For party identification, we asked respondents to identify as either a Democrat, 
Republican, or Independent. Conservatism was measured on a 5 point scale from “very 
liberal” to “very conservative” with “moderate” as a midpoint.   Church attendance was 
constructed by creating a 6 point scale based on how often a person attended church over 
the last year: never; once a year or less; a few times a year; once or twice a month; once a 
week; more than once a week. 
7 “Victim of crime” is a dummy variable for respondents who said their house or 
apartment had been burglarized in the last year, or someone in their household had been a 
victim of a violent crime. Index crime rates and murder rates are taken from the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reports from 2000. Fear of crime is a 5 point scale ranging from “low 
fear of crime” to “high fear of crime” based on the responses to two questions that asked 
how often respondents feared “someone breaking into your house to steal things” and 
how often they feared “being robbed by someone who has a gun or knife.” Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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  The background, value and ideological, and crime salience factors reveal 
significant differences between blacks and whites that may shape differences in 
attributional patterns, though these differences do not point in one direction.   For 
example, blacks are significantly more likely than whites to identify as Democrats 
and liberals than are whites both patterns implying that blacks might take a more 
structuralist view of crime causation.  However, blacks report more frequent church 
attendance than whites, which might encourage a more individual responsibility 
focused outlook on crime.  Likewise, crime is a far more salient experience for 
blacks than whites, as blacks are more likely to report criminal victimization, more 
likely to fear crime, and actually live in higher crime areas. 
  But what do these gaps in social experience and identities mean when it 
comes to how people explain the sources of criminogenic behavior?  Does exposure 
to crime weigh heavily on crime attributions or do ideological differences and 
demographic characteristics condition crime attributions?  We explore these 
questions by modeling the independent effects of these variables, in addition to 
race, on support for each mode of explanation separately. 
  Table 5 presents coefficients for logistic regression models predicting each 
mode of explanation category both pooled across race and separately for black and 
white respondents.  Several patterns are worthy of emphasis.  First, the results show 
that the overall effects of race are strong for structural and individual attributions.  
Blacks were about 3 times (e1.10) more likely than whites to be structuralists and 
about .44 (e-.82) times less likely to be individualists.  Second, beyond race, Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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ideological conservatives and Republicans were more likely to be individualists and 
less likely to be structuralists, all else equal, though party affiliation does not seem 
to matter as much for structuralists as it does for individualist and mixed responses.  
In addition, among structuralists, Southerners and older people were less likely to 
adopt a structuralist mode of explanation while those who had a greater fear of 
crime were much more likely to have a structuralist mode of explanation. 
[Table 5 about here] 
  We next asked if whites and blacks were somehow distinct in their 
approaches to explaining crime.  Among whites, we find that conservatism is a 
significant factor in predicting crime attributions for individualists and 
structuralists, while ideological matters appear to be less influential among black 
respondents.  However, what does seem to matter for blacks and not so much for 
whites is fear of crime.  Yet, the direction of the effect is not what we expected.  
Blacks who fear crime the most were also the ones least likely to be individualists 
and most likely to have a mixed mode of explanation for understanding criminal 
behavior.  Interestingly, among black structuralists, the only variables that proved to 
be significant were whether or not the respondent lived in the South and whether or 
not they were older.  That is, older, Southern blacks were less likely than younger, 
non-Southern blacks to make a structuralist argument about crime origins. In the 
end, there do appear to be significant differences between blacks and whites in 
terms of how they explain crime.  Next, we explore how these differences help to 
explain the polarization around support for crime policies. Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
  21 
C.  Support for Punitive Policies 
  We believe that different modes of explanation may in part help to explain 
the varying levels of support among blacks and whites for punitive policies.  We test 
this claim by exploring two points of exposure to the criminal justice system and 
people’s support for policies that either limit or expand the punitiveness of the 
American criminal justice system.  We first address a policy that seeks to widen the 
net and expand the reach of police and punishment through increased spending on 
law enforcement personnel and prisons.  We then explore support for a policy that 
seeks to ensure that those who do become incarcerated remain so for as long as 
possible by making parole boards more strict.   
  As Table 6 shows, there are large differences between blacks and whites in 
their support for these policies.   For example, over half of all whites view spending 
more money on police and more prisons as a viable strategy, whether in conjunction 
with education and job training programs (45.2%) or in ways that only focus on 
police and prisons (10.2%).  A much smaller percentage of blacks endorsed these 
same views, believing instead that education and job training programs would be a 
better investment when it comes to solving the nation’s crime problem.  And 
although the majority of both whites and blacks think that parole boards should be 
more strict, there is still a sizeable difference between blacks and whites when it 
comes to granting parole to people in prison—77.7% of whites compared to 65.3% 
of blacks think parole boards should be more strict. 
[Table 6 about here] Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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  Certainly, one of the causes of this racial polarization is a real crisis of 
legitimacy and lack of trust of the criminal justice system among blacks (Bobo and 
Thompson 2006).  However, a somewhat different explanation for this large gap in 
support for policy may in fact be that blacks and whites have fundamentally 
different causal explanations for crime.  If people with dispositional attributions for 
behavior are more likely to “blame the individual” for their failures, then there is 
good reason to believe that these same people would also be more likely to support 
more punitive crime policies (Carrol 1978).  After all, if crime is primarily a product 
of individual traits, the best way to stop crime may simply be to capture more 
criminals by placing more police on the streets, building more prisons, and keeping 
them there longer by denying them parole.  
Spending solutions to crime 
  For the first set of questions addressing solutions to crime, we use 
multinomial logit models (see Table 7) and find significant evidence for the claim 
that modes of explanation do indeed influence support for crime policies, net of all 
other variables in our models.  When we compared the likelihood of support for 
each solution to crime relative to the other solutions, we found that mode of 
explanation was important when comparing support for education and job training 
spending relative to spending policies that contained an element of support for 
more police and prisons.  This was especially true for individualists, who were much 
more likely than structuralists to advocate spending for police and prisons over 
education and job training.  While there was support among individualists for Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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education and job training, it was more likely to be in conjunction with spending for 
police and prisons than exclusively for education and job training.  People who have 
dispositional attributions about the causes of crime are committed to policies that 
improve law enforcement and expand our capacity to incarcerate, and are less 
concerned with attacking the social and economic conditions that lead to crime in 
the first place.  The same is true for mixed respondents when comparing “both 
equally” to “education and job training,” however there are no significant 
differences between mixed respondents and structuralists when comparing 
spending for more law enforcement and policies that address the social and 
economic causes of crime. 
[Table 7 about here] 
  As expected, conservatism remains important even after controlling for 
mode of explanation and race.  Political conservatives are about twice as likely (e.75) 
for each unit increase in conservatism than political liberals to support spending for 
police and prisons over education and job training programs.  In addition, they are 
more likely to support spending for police and prisons over spending policies that 
include an element of education and job training, and they are more likely to 
support police and prison spending in conjunction with education and job training 
spending over spending on education and job training alone. To be clear, the more 
conservative people are, the more they view the solution to crime as one that 
requires the expansion of law enforcement by putting more police on the streets 
and building more prisons and not just addressing social and economic problems.  Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Similarly, Republicans were more likely to support spending for law enforcement as 
a deterrent to crime than addressing social and economic problems.  
  Exposure to crime also matters, though it is less consistent across models 
and in fact contradicts our initial expectations about its effects.  Namely, the 
negative effect of fear of crime when comparing support for police or support for 
education and job training versus both equally is in the opposite direction of what 
we expected.  That is, we initially thought fear of crime would lead people to support 
more spending for law enforcement, but we find instead that it is correlated with 
more support for a mixed strategy of spending as a solution to crime.  We can only 
speculate that people who have a greater fear of crime are also more likely to live in 
places where the exposure to crime is greater.8  Thus, because of the more personal 
relationship to crime, they may take a more holistic approach to solving crime by 
supporting spending on both law enforcement and prisons while at the same time 
supporting spending that addresses the social and economic conditions that lead to 
crime. 
  We next direct our attention to the possibility that mode of explanation acts 
as an intervening variable in explaining racially polarized attitudes about the 
criminal justice system.  In each of the models that contain “education and job 
training” as a comparison group, race is a strong predictor of support for spending 
policy before mode of explanation is introduced to our models (see Model 1) and 
continues to be significant even after we introduce mode of explanation. However, 
                                                        
8 Supporting this claim is the fact that fear of crime is positively correlated with crime 
rates and negatively correlated with income and education. Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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the introduction of the mode of explanation variables does help to partially explain 
away some of the effects of race.  In the end, there is only a 15.6 percent decrease in 
the overall effects of race when comparing support for spending on police and 
prisons to more spending on education and job training, and a 12.2 percent 
decrease in the likelihood of support for education and job training compared to 
both equally (converted to probabilities before calculating percentage decrease).  
There is no effect on race in our models that compare support for more spending on 
police and prisons to both equally.   Mode of explanation is an important part of the 
story behind the racial gap in support for crime spending policies, but it is not the 
entire story. 
  We can draw roughly two conclusions from these models.  First, mode of 
explanation does have an independent effect on support for spending policies, 
irrespective of other factors.  Similarly, it acts to explain part of the gap between 
blacks and whites, though, and this is important, not the entire gap.  Secondly, mode 
of explanation, along with race, is only significant when the comparison group is 
education and job training.  That is, the key distinction appears to be between those 
who support spending policies that focus entirely on education and job training 
compared to those who support spending for more law enforcement and prison, 
even if it includes an element of education and job training spending.  
Support for more strict parole boards 
  Unfortunately, these spending policies only address the entry side of the 
crime problem in America.  In cases where crime prevention fails, the next question Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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becomes what to do with convicted criminals once we have them, and if we do 
decide to incarcerate them, how long do we keep them locked up?  As the number of 
prisoners in the nation’s prisons continues to swell, the answer to this question 
becomes an important matter of public policy and human rights.  In the next set of 
models we test the effects of mode of explanation on people’s support for making 
parole boards more or less strict and find that mode of explanation does indeed 
predict support for these policies, independent of other variables. 
  First, the results from these models, shown in Table 8, reflect some of what 
we saw in the previous models when it comes to conservatism.  Conservatives are 
more likely to support more strict parole boards than liberals.9 The effects of 
conservatism are equally strong before and after the mode of explanation variables 
are introduced, likely reflecting the strong current of “tough on crime” approaches 
within the dominant conservative political discourse.  When it comes to 
conservatism, the effects are strong regardless of whether or not you are looking at 
solving the origins of crime or dealing with criminals once you have them. 
[Table 8 about here] 
  Next, there were somewhat mixed results when it comes to exposure to 
crime and fear of crime.  While crime rates have no impact on support for making 
parole boards more strict, fear of crime is an important part of the story.  People 
who fear crime the most are also more likely to support stricter parole boards, 
                                                        
9 We performed tests to determine whether or not there were differences between the 
“leave the same” and “less strict” categories and concluded that statistically speaking, 
there are no significant differences.  Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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independent of the crime rates and independent of mode of explanation.  We also 
find that fear of crime is in the expected direction when it comes to attitudes about 
parole, indicating a more direct link between fear of crime and support for crime 
policies that promise to keep convicted criminals off the street longer.  Ensuring that 
prisoners remain behind bars for as long as possible may act to alleviate some of the 
fear people have about crime. 
  Lastly, mode of explanation does have an impact on support for making 
parole boards more or less strict and seems to also have a small effect on race 
differences in policy outlooks.  Individualists are 2.6 times more likely (e.95) to 
support stricter parole boards than structuralists, as are those in the mixed mode 
category, who are about 1.7 times more likely (e.53) than structuralists.  Besides 
race, mode of explanation is one of the most important predictors of support for 
stricter parole boards. However, race remains a strong predictor of support for 
parole boards being more strict regardless of what we introduce to the model, and 
the decrease in the likelihood of supporting more strict parole boards is only about 
12.2% (converted to probabilities before calculating percentage decrease).  Once 
again, we find mode of explanation to be a significant factor in explaining support 
for more punitive crime policies, yet it stops short of fully explaining the gap 
between blacks and whites, only marginally acting as an intervening variable.  
  A visual representation of these models may sum things up best.  Figures 2a 
and 2b show the main effects from both models after controlling for race and mode 
of explanation.  First, individualists and structuralists, regardless of race, are not Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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likely to support spending money only on police and prisons.  All else equal, there 
tends to be more support for policies that include education and job training.  
Whites however, are somewhat split, with more individualist whites leaning toward 
support for policies that include some form of spending for police and prisons and 
white structuralists being slightly more supportive of policies that include spending 
for education and job training.  Blacks on the other hand tend to lean toward 
policies that include spending for education and job training programs, reflecting a 
more liberal stance on how America should deal with crime.  This is true for both 
types of policies in Figures 2a and 2b. 
[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
  Perhaps the most striking finding in terms of whether or not whites and 
blacks are truly worlds apart when it comes to understanding the problem of crime 
is the fact that even the most externally oriented group of whites, structuralists, are 
hardly any different than the most dispositionally oriented group of blacks.  Put 
differently, black individualists are substantively no different from white 
structuralists.  Blacks and whites, despite the significant differences between 
structuralists and individualists within each racial group remain very polarized 
even when we take into account mode of explanation. 
IV.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS       
Racial polarization on matters of law enforcement and criminal justice remains a 
problem.  We sought to determine whether one factor underlying this polarization 
involved sharply different ways of explaining criminal behavior itself among black Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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and white Americans.  Our results point to real differences in the extent to which 
whites and blacks understand crime as having roots in individuals choices, 
dispositions and failings on the one hand, as opposed to situational or structural 
constraints and limitations, on the other.  To be sure, we find that African Americans 
are substantially more likely than whites to adopt structuralist accounts for criminal 
behavior and that just the opposite pattern exists with regard to endorsing 
individualist accounts for crime.  Yet, blacks and whites are about equally likely to 
adopt “mixed” accounts for crime, straddling the line between structural and 
individual views of criminal behavior.  In sum, there are real differences in core 
attributional tendencies between blacks and whites.  These differences, however, do 
not constitute a sort of gaping polarization in thinking about crime.   
Beyond race, we find that values and ideology help to shape crime attributions.  
In particular, political ideology plays a clear role among whites, though it is less 
consistently influential among blacks.  Among black respondents exposure to and 
particularly fear of crime do more to shape attributional mode.   
Crime explanatory modes matter considerably for crime policy outlooks.  As 
expected, structuralists are more likely than individualists or those offering mixed 
accounts, to stress a non-punitive response to crime.  They are more supportive of 
trying to prevent crime with an emphasis on educational opportunities and jobs 
rather than on more police and prisons.  They are also more likely to encourage less 
stringent practices by parole boards.  Blacks and whites are significantly different 
on these policy matters in the expected directions.  Race-linked differences in Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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attributional patterns account for a part of the race-gap in policy views between 
blacks and whites. However, most of the gap remains even after we have taken into 
account black-white differences in crime explanatory modes. 
The latter pattern suggests that other factors beyond the attributional process 
account for the black-white polarization in the domain of criminal justice.  Some of 
these other factors may include differential personal, family, and community-based 
experiences with agents and institutions of the criminal justice system.    It may also 
reflect a sort of group cultural identity and outlook.   On the former, it seems that 
direct personal negative experiences with agents of the criminal justice system, or 
knowledge of bad experiences reported by family members and close friends is 
sufficiently common in the black community that these experiences create a 
pervasive cynicism about law enforcement and an expectation of race bias (Wilson 
and Dunham 2001).  On the latter, these ideas are also sufficiently widely shared 
and longstanding that they may rise to the level of an aspect of group culture and 
identity, especially among the most politically engaged segments of the black 
population.   To wit, the lion share of the foundation of polarized policy views and of 
enormous differences in expectancies for fair treatment may have more to do with 
direct experience and group culture than with fundamentally different 
understandings of the nature of crime.Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Individual Attributions White Black
People turn to crime because they are lazy.
Strongly/Mostly agree 51.4% 37.0%
Strongly/Mostly disagree 48.6% 63.0%
N 965 994
Strongly/Mostly agree 88.2% 73.8%
Strongly/Mostly disagree 11.8% 26.2%
N 969 997
Structural Attributions
Strongly/Mostly agree 24.8% 49.5%
Strongly/Mostly disagree 75.2% 50.5%
N 966 994
Strongly/Mostly agree 61.7% 67.4%
Strongly/Mostly disagree 38.3% 32.6%
N 963 999
Source: Race, Crime ad Public Opinion Survey, 2001
Table 1. Reasons why some people turn to crime.
People become criminals because they don't care about the rights of 
others or their responsibility to society.
People turn to crime because our society does not guarantee that 
everyone has regular employment.
Poverty and low income in our society are responsble for much of 
crime.Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Mode of Explanation Lazy Not Responsible No Jobs Poverty
Individualist Yes (or) Yes No No
Yes Yes Yes (or) Yes
Mixed Yes (or) Yes Yes (or) Yes
Structuralist No No Yes (or) Yes
Yes (or) Yes Yes Yes
None No No No No
Source: Race, Crime and Public Opinion Survey, 2001
Response Patterns
Individual Attributions Structural Attributions
Table 2. Response Patterns for "Mode of Explanation" for Involvement 
with CrimeThinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Figure 1. Mode of Explanation by Race
51.7%
30.2%
15.2%
2.9%
28.8%
33.3% 32.6%
5.3%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Individualist Mixed Structuralist None
Whites
Blacks
Source: Race, Crime and Public Opinion Survey, 2001
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Table 3. Mode of Explanation by Race
Whites Blacks Total Percent White
Individualist 494 279 773 63.9%
Mixed 288 323 612 47.2%
Structuralist 145 316 461 31.5%
None 28 51 79 34.9%
Total N 955 970 1,925
Source: Race, Crime and Public Opinion Survey, 2001Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations by Race 
Total White Black
Mode of Explanation
Individualist 0.44            ** 0.55            0.31           
(0.50) (0.50) (0.46)
Mixed 0.30            ** 0.28            0.33           
(0.46) (0.45) (0.47)
Structuralist 0.21            ** 0.13            0.30           
(0.41) (0.34) (0.46)
None 0.04            ** 0.04            0.06           
(0.21) (0.19) (0.23)
Demographics
Female 0.56            ** 0.54            0.57           
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Southern 0.45            ** 0.35            0.57           
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49)
Age (in years) 45.19          ** 47.47          42.45         
(16.17) (16.45) (15.38)
Education (in years) 13.33          ** 13.63          12.96         
(2.49) (2.50) (2.43)
Income $49,366 ** $52,763 $45,287
($32,943) ($32,426) ($33,119)
Value and Ideology
Democrat 0.50            ** 0.32            0.73           
(0.50) (0.47) (0.45)
Independent 0.31            ** 0.36            0.25           
(0.46) (0.48) (0.43)
Republican 0.19            ** 0.32            0.02           
(0.39) (0.47) (0.15)
Conservatism
1 2.99            ** 3.13            2.83           
(0.83) (0.85) (0.77)
Church Attendance
2 3.73            ** 3.46            4.06           
(1.56) (1.60) (1.45)
Salience of Crime
Victim of Crime 0.06            ** 0.05            0.07           
(0.23) (0.22) (0.25)
Index Crime (per 100,000) 4,788.40     ** 4,145.72     5,560.27    
(2,084) (1,890) (2,046)
Murder Rate (per 100,000) 9.11            ** 5.67            13.23         
(10.67) (7.39) (12.42)
Fear of Crime
3 2.02            ** 1.92            2.13           
(0.73) (0.65) (0.80)
Source: Race, Crime and Public Opinion Survey, 2001
1Range = 1-5; 1="Very liberal"; 5="Very conservative"
2Range = 1-6; 1="Never"; 6="More than once a week"
3Range = 1-5; 1="Low Fear of Crime"; 5="High Fear of Crime"
**Significant differences between white and black respondents (p<0.05, two-
tailed tests).Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Table 6. Addressing Crime Problems in the U.S. by Race
Question 1 Whites Blacks
White to 
Black Ratio
To lower the crime rate in the U.S. some people think more money should be 
spent on attacking the social and economic problems that lead to crime by 
improving education and job training programs.  Other people think more 
money should be spent on improving law enforcement and deterring crime by 
hiring more police and building more prisons.  Which comes closer to your 
More money for education and job training 35.2% 57.7% 0.6
Both equally 45.2% 35.1% 1.3
More money for police and prisons 10.2% 1.3% 8.0
Neither 9.4% 5.9% 1.6
Total N 781 721
Question 2
When it comes to granting parole to people in prison, should parole boards 
More strict 77.7% 65.3% 1.2
Same as they are now/Less strict 22.3% 43.7% 0.5
Total N 775 713
Source: Race, Crime ad Public Opinion Survey, 2001Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Model 1 Model 2
Demographics
Black -1.01 *** -0.89 ***
Female 0.37 * 0.39 *
Southern 0.18 0.09
Age (in years) -0.66 -0.81 *
Education (in years) -0.10 ** -0.10 **
Income -0.06 -0.10
Values and Ideology
Independent -0.46 * -0.48 *
Republican -0.05 -0.14
Conservatism
2 0.31 ** 0.28 **
Church Attendance
3 0.08 0.07
Salience of Crime
Victim of Crime -0.14 -0.10
Index Crime (per 100,000) 0.00 0.00
Murder Rate (per 100,000) 0.00 -0.01
Fear of Crime
4 0.35 ** 0.42 ***
Mode of Explanation
Individualist
5 0.95 ***
Mixed
5 0.53 *
None
5 0.81
Constant 4.41 4.99
N 1,077 1,077
Wald Chi-square(df) 70.21(14) 82.69(17)
Pseudo R
2 0.07 0.09
Source: Race, Crime and Public Opinion Survey, 2001
2Range = 1-5; 1="Very liberal"; 5="Very conservative"
3Range = 1-6; 1="Never"; 6="More than once a week"
4Range = 1-5; 1="Low Fear of Crime"; 5="High Fear of Crime"
5Compared to "Structuralists"
Table 8. Logistic Regression of Support for Making Parole 
Boards "More Strict" versus "Less Strict/leaving them the 
same."
1
1"Same" and "Less Strict" were combined.  We performed a likelihood ratio test to 
determine whether or not there were significant differences between models that 
combined the two categories and concluded there were no significant differences.Thinking about Crime    10/27/13 
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Source: Race, Crime and Public Opinion Survey, 2001
Figure 2b. Predicted Probability of Support for Making Parole Boards "More 
Strict" versus "Less Strict/leaving them the same" for Individualists and 
Structuralists by Race
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Police and Prisons
Source: Race, Crime and Public Opinion Survey, 2001
Figure 2a. Predicted Probability of Support for Crime Solutions for 
Individualists and Structuralists by Race